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ABSTRACT 
Fraud is a multi-billion dollar industry that continues to grow annually. Many 
organizations are poorly prepared to prevent and detect fraud. Fraud detection 
strategies are intended to quickly and efficiently identify fraudulent activities 
that circumvent preventative measures. In this paper, we adopt a Design-
Science methodological framework to develop a model for detection of vendor 
fraud based on analysis of patterns or signatures identified in enterprise system 
audit trails. The concept is demonstrated by developing prototype software. 
Verification of the prototype is achieved by performing a series of 
experiments. Validation is achieved by independent reviews from auditing 
practitioners. Key findings of this study are: (a) automating routine data 
analytics improves auditor productivity and reduces time taken to identify 
potential fraud; and (b) visualizations assist in promptly identifying potentially 
fraudulent user activities. The study makes the following contributions: (a) a 
model for proactive fraud detection; (b) methods for visualizing user activities 
in transaction data; and (c) a stand-alone Monitoring and Control Layer (MCL) 
based prototype.  
Keywords: fraud detection, enterprise system, SAP, vendor fraud, continuous 
monitoring, audit trails, visualisation, data analytics 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
According to the Association of Certified Fraud Examiners (ACFE) Report to 
the Nations on Occupational Fraud & Abuse, "a typical organization loses five 
percent of its annual revenue to fraud. Applied to the estimated 2011 Gross 
World Product of $70.28 trillion, this figure translates to a potential total fraud 
loss of more than $3.5 trillion" (ACFE, 2012, p. 8). These figures are clear 
evidence that fraud is a major problem, which requires serious study by 
researchers to minimize illegal activities.  
There are two principal methods of getting something from others illegally. 
They can either be physically forced, or they can be deceived into giving up 
their assets. The first type is called robbery and the second is fraud. Albrecht et 
al. (2009) defines fraud as a deception made for personal gain. Deception is 
key. The most common definition of fraud according to Webster's Dictionary 
(2001, p. 380) is: 
Fraud is a generic term that embraces all the multifarious 
means which human ingenuity can devise, which are resorted 
to by one individual, to get an advantage over another by false 
representations. No definite and invariable rule can be laid 
down as a general proposition in defining fraud, as it includes 
surprise, trickery, cunning and unfair ways by which another 
is cheated. The only boundaries defining it are those which 
limit human knavery. 
The ACFE (2010, p. 6) defines occupational fraud as: 
…the use of one's occupation for personal enrichment through 
the deliberate misuse or misapplication of the employing 
organization's resources or assets… 
Occupational fraud is very broad and it encompasses a range of transgressions 
by employees at all levels of an organisational hierarchy. These include: (a) 
asset misappropriations, which involve theft or misuse of an organisation's 
assets; (b) corruption, in which employees wrongfully use their influence in 
business transactions to gain some benefit for themselves or another person, 
contrary to their duty to their employer; and (c) fraudulent statements, which 
usually involve falsification of an organisation's financial statements. 
Fraud can be committed by anyone. Perpetrators cannot usually be 
distinguished from other people on the basis of demographic or psychological 
factors. Individuals involved in fraud are regular people that have 
compromised their integrity and become involved in fraud (Cressey, 1953). 
Several theories exist in the literature as to why individuals commit frauds. A 
common theme in each of the theories is one of conflict of interest. If this 
situation arises between the owner(s) and employees, it may lead to 
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dissatisfaction among employees. Affected employees may seek relief by 
resorting to fraudulent behaviour when an opportunity presents itself (Fama 
and Jensen, 1983; Jensen and Meckling, 1976).  
Owners incur costs in order to monitor opportunistic behaviour of employees. 
By implementing an accounting system, owners are able to leverage an 
essential in-built business function of providing adequate controls to safe guard 
organisational assets. An accounting system provides a means of implementing 
and improving the internal control structure of an organisation. An effective 
accounting system provides an audit trail that allows frauds to be discovered 
and makes concealment difficult. Potential fraud can be discovered in 
accounting records by examining transactions that are anomalous or appear 
otherwise unreasonable (Albrecht et al., 2009; Romney and Steinbart, 2009).  
With advances in information technology and emergence of electronic 
business, modern enterprise systems may record millions of transactions 
annually. An auditor may extract a small sample of these during a financial 
audit. Suppose a fraudster perpetrates only a few frauds annually, it is plausible 
that none of them may be discovered by the financial audit.  Many fraudsters 
rely on this to conceal fraud. Thus, while opportunities to commit fraud 
continue to increase, it appears that insufficient resources are being deployed to 
improve detection using internal controls (Figure 1).  
 
Figure 1 Fraud Detection Methods (ACFE, 2010) 
Implementing a well-designed internal control policy enables an organization 
to reduce opportunities for employees to commit occupational fraud. Further 
reduction in fraud may be achieved by introducing proactive fraud detection 
mechanisms that use computer-based technology (Broady and Roland, 2008) to 
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monitor and analyze business processes at an "unprecedented level of detail"  
(Alles, et al., 2006, p. 138).  
This study adopts a Design-Science methodological framework (Hevner et al., 
2004) to answer the key research question: Can a generalised model for 
proactive detection of vendor fraud in enterprise systems be developed? The 
remainder of this paper is organised as follows: scope of the study; 
methodology used; conceptual model; development of a framework for fraud 
detection; approaches for continuous monitoring and fraud detection; research 
propositions; level of support enterprise systems provide for fraud detection; 
design and development of automated fraud detection strategies; validation of 
prototype; and discussion of some limitations and future research. 
2. SCOPE OF THE STUDY 
When considering an automated solution for proactive fraud detection, the 
focus has to be on questions that can be answered with the aid of computerised 
tools (Lanza, 2007). Some questions are too subjective, for example, Are the 
vendor's goods or services of good quality? Any effort to develop an 
automated solution will require evidence that is documented in an enterprise 
system's audit trails and that can be investigated using data analytics tools. 
Transactions that occur outside an enterprise system cannot be investigated 
using this methodology.   
The ACFE (2010) classifies occupational fraud into three broad categories; 
asset misappropriation, corruption and fraudulent statements. Asset 
misappropriation is the most common category of fraud perpetrated by non-
management employees, occurring in more than 86% of all cases (Table 1). 
The median loss from asset misappropriation was $135,000. (Note: the sum of 
percentages in Table 1 exceeds 100% because several cases involved schemes 
from more than one category). 
Table 1 Categories of Occupational Fraud and Abuse (ACFE, 2010) 
Category % of all Cases Median Loss 
Asset Misappropriation 86.3% $135,000 
Corruption 32.8% $250,000 
Fraudulent Statements 4.8% $4,100,000 
 
Asset misappropriation schemes involve theft of cash and non-cash assets. 
Cash assets are more frequently targeted than non-cash assets. Billing schemes 
was the most common method used to misappropriate cash assets (26%) 
having a median loss of $128,000 (Table 2). 
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Table 2 Sub-Categories of Asset Misappropriation (ACFE, 2010) 
Category % of all Cases Median Loss 
Billing 26.0% $128,000 
Non-Cash Misappropriations 16.3% $90,000 
Expense Reimbursements 15.1% $33,000 
Skimming 14.5% $60,000 
Cheque Tampering 13.4% $131,000 
Cash on Hand 
Misappropriations 
12.6% $23,000 
Cash Larceny 9.8% $100,000 
Payroll 8.5% $72,000 
Cash Register Disbursements 3.0% $23,000 
 
Large scale implementations of enterprise systems have resulted in many 
organisations being highly automated and fully integrated. The development of 
this enterprise system environment provides the necessary infrastructure for the 
effective evolution of the auditing function from a periodic event to an ongoing 
process through the use of computer-based technology. Enterprise systems 
software are available from several vendors, including SAP, Oracle and 
Microsoft, and collectively has 71% of market share world-wide. For several 
years, however, Germany-based enterprise software company SAP has 
consistently been the market leader (Lager and Tsai, 2008; SAP, 2010). In 
2010, Gartner (2010) recognised SAP as the leading vendor of enterprise 
systems software accounting for 22% of the market.  Many organisations have 
realised that SAP solutions are important to their success. Several Fortune 500 
companies, including IBM, Toyota, Apple, Coca-Cola, and Google use SAP 
exclusively for their core day to day operations including accounting and 
financial applications, procurement, order processing and supplier 
management, inventory management, and HR management and payroll 
functions (BOS, 2009; CMU 2011; Gartner, 2010). The prototype developed in 
this research exploits SAP audit trails for proactive detection of vendor fraud 
schemes.  
The scope of this study is therefore limited to detection of vendor fraud 
schemes involving shell companies and non-accomplice vendors in an SAP 
enterprise system using prototype software developed for this purpose. The 
study makes no claims to be able to identify any 'actual' fraudulent activities 
but is limited to extracting data that provide symptomatic evidence that 
fraudulent activities might have occurred. Throughout this study the term 
fraud, fraud detection, or fraud detection tool means potential fraud not actual 
fraud. In the next section, we discuss the methodology adopted by this study.   
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 3. METHODOLOGY 
This study adopts Hevner et al. (2004) Design-Science methodological 
framework. The framework requires creation of an innovative, purposeful 
artefact (guideline 1) for a specified problem domain (guideline 2). Evaluation 
of the artefact is crucial (guideline 3). The artefact must be innovative 
(guideline 4) and rigorously designed and evaluated (guideline 5). It must enact 
an effective solution to a problem space (guideline 6) and results of the 
research must be presented effectively to both technology- and management-
oriented audiences (guideline 7). This study adopts the following methodology: 
1. Literature review – to recognise theories and concepts that underpin 
this study (guidelines 1, and 2). 
2. Create a catalogue of fraud symptoms (guidelines 1, 2, and 4). 
3. Identify data requirements to detect fraud in an SAP Enterprise System 
(guidelines 2, 3, 4, and 6). 
4. Design, develop, and implement prototype software (guidelines 1, 2, 4, 
and 5). 
5. Perform experiments to verify program functionality of the prototype 
(guidelines 3, 6, and 7). 
6. Seek support from experts for validation of the prototype (guideline 7). 
The primary objective of this study is to explore and develop innovative 
methods for proactively detecting vendor fraud in enterprise systems. The 
intention is to build a model for detection of vendor fraud based on analysis of 
patterns or signatures. This study adopts a methodology for proactive fraud 
detection that exploits audit trails in enterprise systems. The concept is 
demonstrated by developing a prototype. The aim of the prototype is to 
confirm the feasibility of implementing proactive vendor detection in practice. 
The prototype is a software application that analyses transaction data from an 
SAP enterprise system for indicators of vendor fraud. Reports and 
visualisations highlighting anomalous activities are produced. Further 
investigation of these findings may be initiated at the discretion of an auditor. 
A conceptual model for the study is developed in the next section. 
4. CONCEPTUAL MODEL 
The conceptual model for this study (Figure 2) incorporates Albrecht et al.’s 
(2009) essential steps in detecting fraudulent activities: 
 understanding the business or operations. 
 performing a risk analysis to identify the types of frauds that can occur. 
 cataloguing the symptoms that the most likely frauds would generate. 
 using computer technology to identify fraud symptoms. 
 analysing the results. 
 investigating suspicious transactions. 
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Figure 2 Conceptual Fraud Model 
The model represents the fundamental nature of fraud and its detection. Firstly, 
the model incorporates factors that motivate an individual to perpetrate fraud. 
It identifies mental states that fraudsters experience prior to perpetrating frauds. 
A fraudster may mentally enact several fraud scenarios until a suitable one is 
found. Once a fraudster determines what to steal, the next decision is how to 
steal it. A fraudster has to determine a specific method of perpetrating fraud. 
The chosen method may entail a series of steps taken to achieve the desired 
outcome of  perpetrating a fraud and concealing it to avoid detection. The key 
concept identified in this part is opportunity. Secondly, the model focuses on 
detection of vendor fraud in an organisation. This is achieved by: 
 Creation of a catalogue of fraud symptoms. 
 Translation of fraud symptoms into detection strategies that can be 
implemented in a prototype. 
 Design and development of a prototype. 
 Experiments performed with enterprise system data. 
The conceptual model provides an understanding of the nature of fraud 
symptoms and its detection in enterprise systems. Fraud is a complex social 
condition that evolves from underlying factors such as dissatisfaction or 
despair. The eventual outcome is that an individual is motivated to 
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misappropriate assets that belong to an organisation. In the next section, we 
develop a framework for detecting fraud. 
5. FRAMEWORK FOR DETECTING FRAUD 
Perpetration of vendor fraud may require the creation of a shell company and 
the submission of fictitious invoices to an organisation for payment (Best et al., 
2009; O'Gara, 2004; Wells, 2002a). To successfully perpetrate this type of 
fraud, the fraudster needs to access to the following enterprise system elements 
(Best et al., 2009; Narayan, 2008; Padhi, 2010): 
 Creation or modification of vendor master records.  
 Invoice entry sub-system.  
Vendor master records can be created or modified in the following ways (Best, 
2008; O'Gara, 2004; Singleton et al., 2008): 
 Create a fake vendor. 
 Temporarily modify an existing vendor (flipping).  
 Permanently modify an existing vendor.  
 Use a one-time account. 
Invoices can be entered in an enterprise system in the following ways (Best, 
2005; Singleton et al., 2008): 
 Create a fake invoice. 
 Use a legitimate invoice.  
 Create or use a duplicate invoice.  
Key components of the framework for vendor fraud detection include defining 
data requirements for fraud detection; and creating a catalogue of fraud 
symptoms. The catalogue of fraud symptoms comprises critical combinations 
of user activities and known vendor fraud symptoms.  
5.1 Critical Combinations 
Many frauds occur because fraudsters exploit the lack of internal controls or 
they may override existing internal controls that are poorly implemented. For 
example, an employee that creates or modifies a vendor master record should 
not be able to enter an invoice. Having this capability does not indicate that a 
fraud has taken place, but it does create an opportunity for fraud to be 
perpetrated. By detecting these critical combinations of user activities: 
 an auditor can further investigate transactions that match known fraud 
symptoms, or appear otherwise anomalous, and  
 an organisation can take steps to correct the situation thereby reducing 
the probability of future fraud.  
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The concept of separating critical business activities in order to reduce fraud is 
termed segregation of duties. In its simplest form, the Segregation of Duties 
(SoDs) principle states that sensitive tasks should be divided into two or more 
steps with each step being performed by a different user (Li et al., 2007). This 
study supports the following principles of SoDs within the accounts payable 
function as proposed by Little and Best (2003): 
 SoDs principle 1: users who can create and modify master records 
should not be able to post transactions.  
 SoDs principle 2: payments should be performed by someone other 
than the person who enters vendor invoices. 
5.2 Known Vendor Fraud Symptoms 
Vendor fraud schemes occur when a fraudster causes an organization to issue a 
payment by submitting invoices for fictitious goods or services, inflated 
invoices, or invoices for personal purchases. Activities that violate segregation 
of duties are indicators of potential fraud and require further investigation. 
These activities may be investigated to determine whether they match known 
vendor fraud symptoms, or appear otherwise anomalous. Methods to detect 
several known vendor fraud symptoms are specified in Table 3. 
In the next section, we identify and describe two major approaches to 
continuous monitoring and fraud detection. 
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Table 3 Methods to Detect Known Vendor Fraud Symptoms  
(Best et al., 2009; Lanza, 2003; Wells, 2008) 
Symptom General Detection Strategy 
Change in vendor payment details followed 
by a change back to the original after a 
short time (flipping) and payments are 
made in the interim period 
Detect changes to vendor master data 
that result in a vendor having different 
bank details over a period of time. 
Payments of invoices are made in the 
interim period. Previous bank details are 
subsequently reinstated after being 
updated with new details.  
Duplicate transactions Check if the same payment details are 
used by more than one vendor. 
Invoices with round dollar amounts Extract all invoices with round dollar 
amounts (e.g., $1000.00). 
Invoices with amounts consistently below 
approval limit 
Extract all vendors with multiple 
invoices below approval limit (e.g., 
several $999 payments to vendor when 
limit is $1000). 
Vendors with payments that exceed their 
12-month average by a significant amount  
Extract all vendors where payments 
exceed 12-month average by a 
percentage e.g., 200%. 
Vendors with payments exceeds the last 
largest payment by a significant amount  
Extract all vendors where payment is 
larger than the last largest payment by a 
percentage e.g., 200%. 
Vendors with similar names Extract all vendors whose names are 
similar to other companies. 
Vendors that become active after long 
periods of being dormant 
Extract all vendors that become active 
after long periods of inactivity. 
Same vendor  having different payment 
details 
Extract all vendors with multiple master 
records, each having different payment 
details. 
Check for multiple payments using 
different bank account details. 
Multiple vendors sharing the same 
payment details 
Extract all vendors that share the same 
payment details. 
6. APPROACHES FOR CONTINUOUS MONITORING AND FRAUD 
DETECTION 
Automated fraud detection requires continuous monitoring of an organisations 
transaction data. Continuous monitoring increases the probability of detecting 
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fraudulent activities (Coderre and Warner, 1999; Potla, 2003). The traditional 
or manual audit approach is limited because it reviews only a small percentage 
of a large population of transactions. Large accounting data files with several 
thousands of transactions are difficult to analyse or monitor manually in real-
time. The alternative therefore is to automate this process by using information  
technology (Broady and Roland, 2008).  
Continuous monitoring is a way to provide constant monitoring and 
surveillance of transaction data in a real or near real-time basis against a set of 
predetermined rule sets (Kuhn Jr. and Sutton, 2010). It enables auditors to 
provide a degree of assurance on information shortly after disclosure (Rezaee 
et al., 2002). It is a step in the path of the evolution of the financial audit from 
manual to computer-based methods. These systems analyse data and search for 
specific patterns or combination of activities. Potentially fraudulent activities 
can therefore be identified shortly after they occur. Widespread adoption of 
computer-based accounting information systems in general, and Enterprise 
Resource Planning (ERP) systems in particular, has contributed to the 
increasing demand for continuous monitoring (Vasarhelyi et al., 2004). 
However, presently only 2.6% of organisations use data monitoring to 
proactively detect fraud (ACFE 2010) (Figure 1). 
Two major approaches to continuous monitoring exist. These are Embedded 
Audit Modules (EAMs), and Monitoring and Control Layer (MCL). 
6.1 Embedded Audit Modules (EAM) 
EAMs are software modules that are built into application programs and are 
specifically designed to continuously capture and monitor audit related 
information (Groomer and Murthy, 1989). If a pre-programmed constraint is 
violated an alert is generated, an auditor is informed, and transaction data is 
saved in a file (Best et al., 2009; Debreceny et al., 2005; Groomer and Murthy, 
1989; Weber 1999). 
Weber (1999) describes EAMs as modules that are placed at specific points 
within a system to gather material information about  events or transactions. 
EAMs are therefore intended to detect and capture data as transactions are 
processed in the enterprise system. When a violation occurs the offending 
transaction can either be rejected or allowed and an error is logged. ERP 
systems are designed to process transactions efficiently and promptly. It is 
therefore not practical to disallow every offending transaction from being 
processed. Depending on the severity of the violation, some transactions could 
be conditionally processed whilst others are rejected. The level of severity of 
errors that would cause a transaction to be rejected needs to be negotiated and 
accepted by the client organisation (Groomer and Murthy, 1989).   
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6.2 Monitoring and Control Layer (MCL) 
The Monitoring and Control Layer (MCL) introduced by Vasarhelyi et al. 
(2004) is an alternative continuous monitoring and auditing approach to EAMs. 
MCLs do not replace EAMs, instead they offer an alternative solution to cater 
for different circumstances (Kuhn and Sutton, 2010). In this approach the 
continuous monitoring and auditing system is separate from the client’s 
enterprise system. MCLs are stand-alone systems that rely on comparisons of 
extracted transaction data with pre-determined constraints that allow for 
continuous monitoring of systems and identification of violations (Du and 
Roohani, 2007). 
The MCL primarily operates as a discrepancy-based audit monitoring tool, i.e., 
audit by exception (Vasarhelyi et al., 2004). The MCL continuously captures 
enterprise data and analyses it to detect any deviations from the norm. When an 
exception is detected, it is recorded. It will require further review by 
compliance personnel in order to identify the underlying problem. These 
further reviews are at the discretion of internal auditors.  
In the next section, the study’s research propositions are developed. 
7. RESEARCH PROPOSITIONS 
To facilitate answering the study’s key research question, the following 
research sub-questions and propositions have been formulated. Each of the 
propositions directs attention to a specific issue that needs to be examined 
within the scope its research sub-question. The propositions assist in directing 
the study towards the desired outcome of answering the primary research 
question and proving the conceptual model.  
SQ1: How do enterprise systems support proactive detection of potential 
fraud in financial transactions? 
To answer this research sub-question, three propositions have been formulated.  
RP1a: Enterprise system audit trails document adequate data to allow 
retrospective monitoring of user activities. 
RP1b: Violations in segregation of duties can be identified by analysing audit 
trails for critical combinations of user activities. 
RP1c: Potentially fraudulent transactions can be identified by investigating 
user activities that violate segregation of duties, match known fraud symptoms, 
or appear otherwise anomalous. 
SQ2: How can detection of potential fraud in enterprise systems be 
effectively and efficiently automated to ensure minimal auditor 
interaction? 
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To address this research sub-question, three propositions have been formulated. 
RP2a: Software can be developed to identify potentially fraudulent activities 
and report these using an intuitive visual interface. 
RP2b: Threat monitoring and potential fraud detection can be implemented on 
a stand-alone external computer system operating independently of an 
organisation's enterprise system. 
RP2c: Efficiency and effectiveness of the audit process can be improved by 
using technology to perform continuous monitoring of an organisation's 
enterprise system. 
The next section examines the level of support enterprise systems provide for 
proactive fraud detection.   
8. ENTERPRISE SYSTEM SUPPORT FOR PROACTIVE FRAUD 
DETECTION 
Audit trails are records of users’ activities within an information system (Best, 
2005; NIST, 2005). Audit trails are maintained by the operating system and 
applications such as database systems and enterprise systems (Best et al., 
2004). The information captured in an audit trail is dependent on what events 
are being audited by the system (SAP-AG, 2009). In conjunction with 
appropriate tools and procedures, audit trails can assist in detecting fraudulent 
activities. For example, an audit trail on a payment of a vendor invoice begins 
with the receipt of the invoice. The invoice is tracked through accounts 
payable, all the way through to payment in order to settle the debt (Tatum, 
2010). 
To detect fraudulent activities in an enterprise system, some fundamental data 
is required. At a minimum, to detect fraud schemes listed in Table 3, an MCL-
based application will require access to generic data items that define the event 
(who, when, where, and how) as well as specific data items relating to each 
scheme. Accordingly, this data should minimally include: 
 user name – name of the user that performed the transaction. 
 date – that the transaction was performed. 
 time – that the transaction was performed. 
 computer workstation – that the transaction was performed on. 
 transaction  performed – the specific transaction that the user 
performed (e.g., entering an invoice, posting a payment). 
 transaction details – data relating to the transaction performed (e.g., 
vendor bank details, invoice amount). 
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8.1 SAP Enterprise System Audit Trails 
SAP audit trails provide detailed descriptions of functions performed within an 
enterprise system. Each function in SAP has a transaction code associated with 
it. A transaction code (or tcode) consists of letters, numbers, or both (for 
example, FB60–Enter Vendor Invoice). A transaction code is a shortcut that 
takes the user directly to a SAP application rather than having to navigate 
through the menu system (Padhi, 2010). Each transaction code executed by a 
user is recorded in the audit trail (Best, 2000). The audit trail data required for 
this study is stored in several tables within the SAP enterprise system.  
Changes to master records are stored in two tables, CDHDR Change Document 
Headers, and CDPOS Change Document Items (Best, 2005; Best et al., 2009; 
Hirao, 2009; Padhi 2010). Changes to master records include creation and 
deletion of master records and changes to fields. For every change document 
number, there is a corresponding change document item in the CDPOS table.  
 
Figure 3 SAP Audit Trails 
Accounting audit trails are stored in tables BKPF–Accounting Document 
Header, BSEG–Accounting Document Line Item, SKAT–General Ledger 
Account Texts, and LFA1–Vendor General Data. Tables BKPF and BSEG 
store posting histories for general ledger, and subsidiary ledger accounts. This 
facilitates integration of data and automatic reconciliation of subsidiary ledgers 
with reconciliation accounts. General ledger account texts (names) are stored in 
table SKAT. Vendor general data including vendor name, date created and 
creating user are stored in table LFA1.  
8.2 Identifying Critical Combinations and Known Vendor Fraud 
Symptoms 
The segregation of duties (SoDs) principles previously discussed may be 
detected in SAP by examining tcodes of functions performed by users. This 
data allows association of actions with users'. A list of critical combination of 
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activities a user has to perform in order to violate each of the SoDs principles is 
shown in Table 4. If any of these violations are identified then further 
investigation of an offending user's activities is necessary to determine whether 
any fraudulent transactions have been performed. 
Given the ability to identify violations in segregation of duties, it is feasible to 
detect fraudulent transactions made possible by these violations. For example, 
the ability to identify users who have changed vendor details, entered an 
invoice and paid the invoice permits detection of vendor fraud. In addition, 
further vendor fraud can be detected through examination of other anomalous 
activities (Table 3). 
Table 4 SAP Transaction Codes (adapted from SAP table TSTCT) 
T-Code SAP Description 
Vendor Maintenance 
FK01 Create Vendor (Accounting) 
FK02 Change Vendor (Accounting) 
XK01 Create Vendor (Centrally) 
XK02 Change Vendor (Centrally) 
Enter Invoice 
FB60 Enter Vendor Invoice 
F-43 Enter Vendor Invoice: Header Data 
FB01 Post Document (allows posting of any financial transaction) 
FB10 Invoice/Credit Memo Fast Entry 
Post Payment 
F-53 Post Outgoing Payment 
F-58 Post Payment with Printout 
F110 Automatic Payments 
 
Data describing user activities is well-documented in the audit trails of SAP 
enterprise systems. Analysing user activities for vendor fraud, however, is a 
difficult task if done manually. Computer based data analytics can be used to 
detect fraudulent activities that have already occurred, as well as determining 
the propensity for frauds occurring in the future (Edge and Sampaio, 2009).  
An automated methodology for vendor fraud detection is proposed and 
developed in the next section. 
9. AUTOMATING FRAUD DETECTION IN ENTERPRISE SYSTEMS 
Modern integrated enterprise systems may record several thousands of 
transactions daily. This enormous amount of transactions makes it difficult to 
find a few instances of fraud among legitimate transactions. For large 
organisations, this means monitoring hundreds of thousands of transactions and 
then investigating suspicious ones in depth at considerable expense. A concern 
often raised in the literature regarding continuous fraud detection systems 
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relates to information overload (Alles et al., 2006; Alles et al., 2008; Kuhn and 
Sutton, 2006). Simple detection of fraudulent activities is insufficient. 
Approaches that reduce the burden of excessive information presented to an 
auditor are more likely to contribute to the overall effectiveness of the audit 
process. One method is to use visualisation to present information graphically 
(Fetaji, 2011; Liang and Miranda, 2001). Visualisation is a general term used 
to describe any technology that enable users to 'see' information in order to 
help them better understand and put it in an appropriate  context (GraphViz, 
2010; TechTarget, 2010). Visualisation tools go beyond the standard charts and 
graphs, displaying data in more sophisticated ways such as dials and gauges, 
heat maps, tree maps and detailed bar and pie charts. Patterns, trends and 
correlations that might go undetected in text-based data can be exposed and 
recognised easier with visualisation. Details on how the prototype addresses 
these issues are provided in the next section. 
This study proposes a two-phase MCL-based strategy for detection of vendor 
fraud in a SAP enterprise system. In phase one, transaction data is periodically 
extracted from SAP. Data is extracted through the SAP data dictionary. The 
following data are extracted:  
 Change document headers: extracted from table CDHDR to identify 
transactions that violate SoDs. 
 Change document items: extracted from table CDPOS to identify 
Insert (I) changes involving vendors, table LFBK, and field KEY. 
 Accounting document headers: extracted from table BKPF for 
documents involving target user and transaction codes associated with 
invoices and payments. 
 Accounting document line items: extracted from table BSEG for 
postings involving target user and accounts payable general ledger 
accounts. 
 Vendor general data: extracted from table LFA1 for identifying vendor 
account information. 
Phase two involves the analysis of extracted transaction data by a software 
application. This occurs in two stages. Stage one consists of profiling users to 
determine whether any violations in SoDs principles have occurred. In stage 
two, transactions processed by these particular users may be investigated by 
compliance personnel to determine whether any are fraudulent. 
9.1 Prototype Development 
A prototype is a partial or simplified implementation of a complete system 
(Asur and Hufnagel 1993; Davis, 1992) built for a specific purpose such as: 
 formulating and evaluating requirements, specifications and designs. 
 demonstrating feasibility, system behaviour or performance. 
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 identifying and reducing risks of system mis-development. 
 communicating ideas, especially among diverse groups. 
 answering questions about specific properties of proposed systems 
(Luqi and Steigerwald, 1992). 
Two key advantages for constructing software prototypes relevant to this study 
are (Asur and Hufnagel, 1993; Budde and Zullighoven, 1990):  
 to provide users with a 'tangible' idea of the problem solution being 
sought after. 
 to demonstrate the technical feasibility of a specification. 
The prototype is intended to demonstrate that the concept of proactive 
detection of vendor fraud is feasible in practice. It is a limited version meant 
for showcasing the concept and for testing purposes only. It produces a 
combination of user- and vendor-centric reports and visualisations. A Fraud 
Analytics Dashboard provides a high-level overview of activities performed in 
the system (Figure 4). Transaction activities are summarised using pie and bar 
charts (Figure 5) and link node diagrams (Figure 6). These presentation 
methods augment standard text-based reports produced by the prototype and 
support a reduction in information presented to an auditor.  
These visualization methods serve to reduce the problem of information 
overload by presenting voluminous information graphically. 
 
 
Figure 4 Fraud Analytics Dashboard 
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Figure 5 Benford's Law–Znalysis of Vendor Invoices 
 
Figure 4 Visualization of Vendors Touched by User - USRARSCP 
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9.2 Prototype Verification using Test Data 
Software verification and validation is the process of checking that a software 
system meets specifications and that it fulfils its intended purpose. It is a 
disciplined approach to assessing software products that strives to ensure that 
quality is built into the software and that it satisfies user requirements (IEEE, 
2004; Wallace et al., 1996). 
Verification is an attempt to ensure that the product is built correctly and that 
the outputs of activities meet specifications imposed on them during the design 
phase. Software verification looks for consistency, completeness, and 
correctness of the software and its supporting documentation. Software testing 
is one of many verification activities intended to confirm that software 
development output meets its input requirements. Other verification activities 
may include code and document inspections, walkthroughs, and other 
techniques (USDoHHS, 1997).  
The prototype is an Expert System intended to support a human expert in the 
decision making process. It is based on computational rules and a knowledge 
base. The power of the prototype is in the effectiveness and quality of the 
knowledge it contains. To ensure quality, the knowledge base needs to be 
verified. Potential problems can be grouped into (Cojocariu et al., 2005): 
 Consistency problems – caused by unnecessary conditions, redundant 
or conflicting rules; and 
 Completeness problems – caused by missing rules, errors, or gaps in 
the inference chains. 
Verification of the prototype was achieved by performing a series of tests using 
simulated test data involving simulated activity over a period of one month. 
Initially, a series of “manual” experiments were performed on the test data to 
establish control values. These experiments were performed using Microsoft 
Excel. The same experiments were subsequently performed using the prototype 
and the values produced were reconciled with the control values. 
Inconsistencies in results were used to correct errors in the prototypes 
computational rules and knowledge base. These tests served to assess whether 
the software performed correctly, that it met the specifications imposed on it, 
and to provide a demonstration of the potential use of the prototype. 
Additional experiments were performed to determine the processing 
capabilities of the prototype.  
9.3 Analysis of Processing Times 
A series of experiments were performed to determine whether the effectiveness 
and efficiency of the audit process can be improved by using technology. 
Experiments were performed using large and small data-sets. Processing time 
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remained comparatively constant regardless of the size of the data-set (Table 
5). Transaction data can be extracted, downloaded, and pre-processed in 
approximately 40 minutes. An auditor then has the rest of the working day to 
analyze the data and conduct further detailed investigations of users or 
vendors.  These tests indicate that auditor productivity may be improved when 
using the prototype to support the audit process. Independent reviews and an 
expert panel demonstration, discussed in the following section, provide further 
evidence in support of this conclusion. 
Table 5 Average Processing Time for All Tests 
 
9.4 Analysis of Case Study Data using Prototype 
Six months of actual transaction data was processed using the prototype. This 
data was obtained from a large international manufacturing company. These 
tests exposed the prototype to live data. [Data was also collected on processing 
times]. A detailed trace of the processing of this data was generated. The scope 
of analysis was as follows: 
Organization: (large international manufacturing company) 
System: SAP ECC 5.0 
Module: Accounts Payable 
Fraud category: Asset Misappropriation 
Sub-category: Billing schemes, shell company schemes, non-
accomplice vendor schemes 
Transactions: Vendor invoices, vendor payments, maintenance of 
vendor banking details 
Analysis period: 01/01/2011 to 30/06/2011 
SAP client: 700 
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Analysis procedures included: 
User profiles: Users are profiled to determine the scope of activities 
they have performed. Activities include vendor 
maintenance, invoicing and payment transactions. 
Summary and detailed reports are produced. 
Critical 
combinations: 
Users that violate segregation of duties are identified 
and a report of potentially risky users is produced. 
Activity analysis: An individual user is identified from the risky users 
list and selected for detailed investigation. Reports 
documenting individual user activities are produced. 
Vendor analysis: A series of investigations are performed on active 
vendors, including vendors sharing bank accounts, 
vendors with multiple bank accounts, vendors with 
multiple master records, and Benford’s law. 
9.5 Summary of Findings from Case Study 
ICT support staff performed functions of normal users including entering 
invoices and paying vendors. This situation is not recommended as it violates 
normal segregation of duties principles of: (a) separating users from SAP 
support functions; and (b) separating entry of invoices/postings and payment 
functions. This poses a considerable fraud risk and requires review.  
Several postings were made using SAP transaction code FB01- Post 
Document. It is generally recommended that users not use FB01 for entry of 
transactions. This transaction code allows the user to post any financial 
transaction including general ledger, customer, vendor, inventory, or asset 
transactions. The user enters a document type (e.g., SA, for GL postings) as 
part of the header data and then enters relevant data. Security guidelines 
usually recommend that no user be granted access to this transaction code; 
rather their profile should allow access to a set of specific transaction codes 
associated with their position (e.g., an accounts payable clerk). This provides 
proper segregation of duties. 
Several users performed vendor maintenance, invoice entry, and payment 
processing activities. These activities violate segregation of duties principles. 
Roles of all users that have performed these activities require review and 
appropriate restrictions ought to be applied to their SAP profiles. 
Several postings with round dollar amounts were identified. Round dollar 
values have a higher probability of being fraudulent (Wells, 2011, p. 113). 
These transactions require review to determine whether they are genuine.  
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It was observed that several vendors were sharing bank accounts. These appear 
to involve vendors with multiple vendor numbers for the same vendor. These 
vendors should be examined to check that they are genuine. There were also 
several vendors with multiple bank accounts. These appear to involve vendors 
with multiple master records. Duplicate vendor master records are a potential 
fraud risk and should be eliminated. It is recommended that the vendor master 
file be periodically cleaned. 
Several cases of flipping banking details were observed. Flipping occurs when 
a vendor’s payment details are temporarily changed, a payment is made, and 
banking details are changed back to the original. This may be indicative of 
fraud where the fraudster redirects payments to their personal bank account. 
These transactions should be examined by internal audit to ensure that changes 
were authorized. 
Benford’s Law gives expected frequencies of digits in numerical data. Contrary 
to belief, digits are not equally likely and are biased towards lower digits. 
Benford's Law analysis of the first two digits for vendor invoices revealed 
large spikes at 11, 22, 27, 36, 45, 54, and 67.  Spikes also occurred at 22, 27, 
36, 37, and 45 for vendor payments. Other smaller spikes were also observed 
for invoices and payments. Large spikes are indicative of potential fraud. These 
transactions require further examination to determine whether they are genuine. 
9.6 Comments on Findings from Case Study 
It should be noted that in organizations with Accounts Payable sections having 
small numbers of staff, complete segregation of duties may not be feasible. 
These organizations may implement other compensating manual processes that 
safeguard against inappropriate activity. However, SAP support staff roles 
should be quite distinct from normal user roles, given they can also create 
dummy user accounts. If they run batch jobs to process large volumes on 
behalf of users, there should be manual processes for approving and reviewing 
these jobs.  
The results of the case study analysis require close examination by internal 
audit to determine whether these vulnerabilities/anomalies were actually 
associated with fraudulent activities.  
In the next section, the prototype is reviewed by independent auditing 
practitioners in order to determine that it is the right product and that it fulfils 
its purpose. 
10. PROTOTYPE VALIDATION 
Validation is an attempt to ensure that the right product is built and that the 
product fulfils its specific intended purpose. Validation therefore is the 
confirmation by examination and provision of objective evidence that software 
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specifications conform to user needs and intended uses, and that the particular 
requirements implemented through software can be consistently fulfilled. 
Validation includes useability testing and user feedback.  
Validation of the prototype was achieved by obtaining independent reviews 
from auditing practitioners. In each case, the reviewer(s) were provided with a 
summary paper (Singh et al., 2011), a one-hour presentation, and 
demonstration of the prototype. The demonstration involved processing and 
analysing using both simulated test data and actual transaction data. 
Feedback was requested on the following issues [results are discussed in 
Section 10.1]:  
a) The importance of such a project for auditing in an organisation. 
b) The role that automated fraud detection software could play as an 
auditing tool for internal auditors. 
c) The desirability of a retrospective analysis software tool implemented 
on a standalone computer system as compared with a system 
embedded within an enterprise system.  
d) The functionality of the prototype, in particular the user interface, 
reporting and graphical features. 
e) Further comments or suggestions for improvement to the prototype.  
 
Feedback was also obtained from a panel of experts. They were also provided 
with a summary paper, a one-hour presentation, and demonstration of the 
prototype. Their feedback was sought using a survey on key issues including: 
operation, reporting and visualisations, accuracy & efficiency, and impact on 
auditor productivity.  
10.1 Independent Review and Expert Panel Feedback 
Three independent reviewers provided feedback on the prototype. The first 
review was conducted by the Executive Director–Information Systems Audit 
of a top international accounting firm, based in Australia. His comments are 
given below: 
A project of this nature is considered to be of high importance 
to organisations. It provides a mechanism to pro-actively 
monitor fraud risk, a key risk in any organisation. It also 
demonstrates a commitment to compliance with Corporate 
Governance Principles and Recommendations as outlined by 
ASX Corporate Governance Council. 
Automated fraud detection software can provide internal 
auditors with a tool to efficiently assess the presence of fraud 
within an organization. This may also be applied to testing the 
effectiveness of the controls that management may have in 
place. A tool of this nature can ensure that the management of 
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the risk of fraud can be undertaken on a more regular or 
continual basis. 
In general, I found the functionality of the tool to be useful. 
The user interface would require a minimal level of training 
and some level of understanding of the SAP application, which 
is a reasonable constraint. The graphs and visualizations 
clearly communicated a message for the reader. The speed of 
running the queries was impressive. 
The other two reviewers (both senior management executives in an 
international manufacturing company) provided equally supportive comments 
and also felt that the prototype should be further extended to other areas 
including accounts receivable, fixed assets, and general ledger. 
Expert Panel members were provided with a survey instrument and asked to 
rate key issues on a scale of 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). 
Twenty-three responses were received. Results are discussed below. 
Operation. Panel members rated the prototype as being easy to use, user-
friendly, and providing adequate on-screen instructions (Table 6). 
Table 6 Operation of Prototype 
Operation 
(Questionnaire scale 1 to 7) 
Mean Variance Std Dev. 
Easy to use 5.87 0.45 0.81 
User-friendly 5.78 0.45 0.67 
Navigation of user interface is simple 5.65 0.60 0.78 
Onscreen instructions/ help is adequate  5.78 0.36 0.60 
Data entry is straightforward 5.70 0.40 0.63 
N=23 
 
Reports and visualisations. Panel members rated reports as being easy to 
understand, useful in identifying potential fraud and in aggregating enormous 
amount of information. Visualisations were also seen as enabling identification 
of relationships or patterns in data that would otherwise be difficult in textual 
data. Overall, the group rated reports and visualisations as important tools in a 
fraud investigator's toolkit (Tables 7 and 8). 
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Table 7 Reports  
Reports 
(Questionnaire scale 1 to 7) Mean Variance Std Dev. 
Easy to understand 5.91 0.63 0.79 
Contains adequate information  5.87 0.48 0.69 
Helpful in identifying potential fraud 6.22 0.36 0.60 
Are an important tool in a fraud investigators toolkit 6.17 0.33 0.58 
N=23 
 
Table 8 Visualisations  
Visualisations (charts & diagrams) 
(Questionnaire scale 1 to 7) 
Mean Variance Std Dev. 
Easy to understand 5.87 0.87 0.92 
Useful in aggregating an enormous amount of 
information 
6.09 0.54 0.73 
Enables effective exploration of data in a graphical 
format  
6.13 0.57 0.76 
Enables identification of relationships or patterns in 
data that are otherwise difficult to do in textual data 
6.17 0.60 0.78 
Enhances investigation and analysis for potential fraud 6.22 0.54 0.74 
Are an innovative way of presenting information 6.35 0.42 0.65 
Are an important tool in a fraud investigators toolkit 6.04 0.77 0.88 
N=23 
 
Accuracy, efficiency and performance. The prototype was rated as producing 
quality, useful and accurate results. Panel members agreed that the prototype 
was an improvement over basic analytical tools and results were produced in a 
much faster time than if done manually. They also felt that there was potential 
to save costs and reduce future fraud by early detection of suspicious user 
activities (Table 9). 
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Table 9 Accuracy, Efficiency and Performance  
Accuracy, Efficiency and Performance 
(Questionnaire scale 1 to 7) 
Mean Variance Std Dev. 
Produces quality results that are useful in 
identifying potential fraud 
5.96 0.50 0.71 
Results are  accurate and dependable 6.09 0.36 0.60 
Produces the same results as a human expert 6.00 0.55 0.74 
Generates results much faster than doing a similar 
task manually 
6.35 0.42 0.65 
Is an improvement over basic analysis as it 
replaces blind querying of data with contextual 
analysis 
5.96 0.59 0.77 
Significantly enhances the internal auditing process 5.87 0.30 0.55 
Potential to save costs due to improved fraud 
detection 
6.13 0.39 0.63 
Potential to reduce future fraud by early detection 
of suspect user activity 
6.22 0.45 0.67 
N=23 
 
Auditor productivity. Panel members collectively agreed that the prototype 
may reduce time taken to identify potential fraud (Table 10). They were asked 
to rate the number of person days it would take to review a system for fraud 
based on 30,000 transactions. Their responses are shown in Tables 11 to 13. 
Table 10 Visualisations  
Auditor Productivity 
(Questionnaire scale 1 to 7) 
Mean Variance Std Dev. 
This software may reduce time taken to identify 
potential fraud in an organisation 
6.30 0.49 0.70 
N=23 
 
Panel members generally agreed that it would take 20+ days (39.1%) or it 
would be an impractical task (60.9%) to audit the stated number of 
transactions, if done manually (Table 11). 
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Table 11 Time to Process Manually 
Q 4.1a Value (days) Count % 
How long would it take to review for fraud, if done 
manually? 
Impractical U 14 60.9% 
  20+ 9 39.1% 
  10 0 0.0% 
  5 0 0.0% 
  3 0 0.0% 
  1 0 0.0% 
 Less than 1 <1 0 0.0% 
N=23 
 
Panel members agreed that it would take between 1 and 20+ days to audit the 
stated number of transactions using other software (e.g., ACL, Access, and 
Excel) (Table 12).  
Table 12 Time to Process with Other Software  
Q 4.1b Value (days) Count % 
How long would it take to review for fraud, if done 
using other software? 
Impractical U 0 0.0% 
  20+ 8 34.8% 
  10 9 39.1% 
  5 3 13.0% 
  3 1 4.3% 
  1 2 8.7% 
 Less than 1 <1 0 0.0% 
N=23 
 
Panel members agreed that it would take between <1 to 5 days to audit the 
stated number of transactions using the prototype. Most agreed that 3 days 
(43.5%) was standard, 21.7% said 1 day and 17.4% said either 5 days or <1 
day (Table 13). From these ratings, it may be concluded that using the 
prototype as a tool for detection of potential fraud improves auditor 
productivity. 
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Table 13 Time to Process with Prototype 
Q 4.1c Value (days) Count % 
How long would it take to review for fraud, if done 
using the prototype software? 
Impractical U 0 0.0% 
  20+ 0 0.0% 
  10 0 0.0% 
  5 4 17.4% 
  3 10 43.5% 
  1 5 21.7% 
 Less than 1 <1 4 17.4% 
N=23 
 
Overall evaluation. Panel members considered the prototype a useful auditing 
tool that represented substantial advances over other tools currently available 
in the market. They are likely to use or recommend this tool should it be 
commercially available (Table 14). 
Table 14 Overall evaluation  
Overall Evaluation 
(Questionnaire scale 1 to 7) 
Mean Variance Std Dev. 
This software represents substantial advances over 
other tools currently available in the market 
5.96 0.41 0.64 
If available,  I am likely to use this software 5.70 0.68 0.82 
If available,  I am likely to recommend this software 
to others 
6.04 0.59 0.77 
Overall, this software is a useful auditing tool  6.22 0.72 0.85 
N=23 
 
The findings and contributions of this study need to be considered within its 
limitations. These limitations and recommendations for future research are 
discussed next.  
11. LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
The first limitation of this study is that there is insufficient access to data to 
determine the level of fraud prevalent in organisations. Many frauds that occur 
are handled quietly by the victim organisations as they are more concerned 
about the embarrassment of making frauds public and the costs associated with 
fraud investigations. Consequently, organisations with and without fraud 
experiences are not prepared to provide access to their transaction data. This 
situation is confirmed in a survey conducted by AuditNet (2011) where it was 
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found that one of the 10 key challenges for data analytics is the difficulty of 
getting data to perform analyses. Therefore, the single case study approach was 
adopted for this study. Future research could extend this study by replication in 
other organisations locally and internationally to test whether the same findings 
are observed or not. 
The second limitation of this study is the generalisability of results is limited. 
The focus of this study is on a single category of occupational fraud, namely, 
asset misappropriation. Within asset misappropriation, the study focuses on 
billing fraud schemes involving shell companies and non-accomplice vendors 
in accounts payable. This limits identification of potential threats or frauds. 
Generalising the findings to other categories of fraud (such as accounts 
receivable) therefore must be made with caution. Extending the focus of the 
catalogue of fraud symptoms and fraud detection algorithms developed in this 
study to include other fraud schemes will extend identification of potential 
threats or frauds. 
12. CONCLUSION 
Fraud is a global problem that continues to grow annually. Results from the 
ACFE (2012) Report to the Nation on Occupational Fraud and Abuse 
highlights the significance and pervasiveness of the fraud problem. The Report 
concluded that the projected annual loss due to fraud is approximately $3.5 
trillion. Furthermore an AuditNet survey (2012) of more than 1500 auditors 
concluded that the use of data analytics tools and techniques are not being 
maximized in routine audit activities. Therefore the financial impact of fraud 
appears to be increasing yet resources and technology are not being effectively 
deployed to address the problem. Enhancing the ability of organizations to 
detect potential fraud may have a positive impact on the economy. An effective 
model that facilitates proactive detection of potential fraud may potentially 
save costs and reduce the propensity of future fraud by early detection of 
suspicious user activities.  
Enterprise systems generate hundreds of thousands to millions of transactions 
annually. The enormous amount of generated transactions makes it difficult to 
find few potentially fraudulent instances among legitimate transactions. 
Without the availability of proactive fraud detection tools, investigating 
suspicious activities becomes overwhelming.  
Using the Design-Science framework, this study has established that: 
 enterprise system audit trails document adequate data to allow 
retrospective monitoring of user activities (RP1a). 
 violations in segregation of duties can be identified by analysing audit 
trails for critical combinations of user activities (RP1b). 
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 potentially fraudulent transactions can be identified by investigating 
user activities that violate segregation of duties, match known fraud 
symptoms, or appear otherwise anomalous (RP1c). 
 software can be developed to identify potentially fraudulent activities 
and report these using an intuitive visual interface (RP2a). 
 threat monitoring and potential fraud detection can be implemented on 
a stand-alone external computer system based on the MCL approach 
(RP2b. 
 efficiency and effectiveness of the audit process can be improved by 
using technology to perform continuous monitoring (RP2c). 
This study has demonstrated the feasibility of implementing proactive vendor 
fraud detection in enterprise systems. 
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